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1005 
Foreign Law as Legislative Fact in Constitutional 
Cases 
A. Christopher Bryant 
ABSTRACT 
Do we really need another law review article about foreign law in 
constitutional interpretation? In fact, we do. In the vast literature on 
the subject, a fundamental point has received scant attention. In the 
recent rulings that have stoked the present controversy, the Supreme 
Court has employed foreign law not as law, but rather merely as 
evidence of a legislative fact made relevant by domestic constitutional 
law. Commentators, however, have largely directed their attention to 
the merits of a genuine constitutional comparativism in which foreign 
law serves as a model for the creation of domestic constitutional 
doctrine. Many commentators have advocated just such an approach, 
and at least one sitting Justice has joined in this chorus in both 
extrajudicial commentary and in a dissenting opinion. But to date, the 
Court has yet to take this much-mooted step, perhaps due to an 
awareness of the complex theoretical challenges such an approach would 
raise. A few opponents to the Court’s actual practice have forcefully 
observed that the Court’s use of foreign law has lacked the rigor and 
impartiality that would be necessary to make it credible. What even 
these scholars have not done, and what this Article ventures, is to 
consider these claims within the broader context of the Court’s use, and 
misuse, of all manner of evidence employed in connection with questions 
of legislative fact in constitutional adjudication. 
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Williams, as well as all the participants in a workshop held at the University of Cincinnati 
College of Law. Thanks also to Anna Dailey, Taryn Filo, and Greg Horn for excellent research 
assistance, and the University of Cincinnati College of Law and the Harold C. Schott 
Foundation for financial support. Of course, any remaining errors are mine alone.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2010, Oklahoma voters, by an overwhelming 
margin, amended their state constitution to command that “courts 
shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.”1 
The Oklahoma ballot initiative is only the most recent of many 
manifestations of hostility to judicial reliance on foreign law. In the 
last decade, the propriety of the U.S. Supreme Court’s invocation of 
foreign law in constitutional cases has been one of the hottest topics 
in legal scholarship. Yet the heat generated so far has proven 
unusually disproportionate to the light cast. By examining the 
subject as one aspect of the Court’s confrontation with questions of 
legislative fact in constitutional cases, this Article seeks to correct that 
imbalance. 
Legislative facts, also sometimes referred to as social facts, 
transcend the parties to a discrete case and concern the public policy 
judgment leading to the enactment of legislation. At least since the 
early 1940s, commentators and jurists have distinguished legislative 
facts from adjudicative facts, which concern the application of a 
general rule to the unique, concrete circumstances of a particular 
dispute. In contemporary jurisprudence, the constitutional validity of 
a challenged statute often turns on a question of legislative fact. For 
example, the constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act depended upon whether the proscribed procedure was 
medically necessary in a significant number of cases. Numerous 
physicians and six lower federal courts said that it was. But the 
Supreme Court concluded that the issue was subject to 
“documented medical disagreement” and that Congress was entitled 
to side with the skeptics.2 
Likewise, the result in many of the most prominent 
constitutional rulings from the last decade ultimately turned on the 
Court’s assessment of a disputed question of legislative fact, 
including decisions concerning the scope of congressional power 
 
 1. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (quoting 
Oklahoma State Question 755). The court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
certification of the election results for the initiative pending the court’s ruling on the merits of 
a constitutional challenge to the initiative. Id. at 1308. Similar laws are under consideration, or 
have been enacted, in at least six other states. See Donna Leinwand, States Enter Debate on 
Sharia Law: Are Bans Like Oklahoma’s Necessary, Constitutional, Anti-Islamic?, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 9, 2010, at 3A.  
 2. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 162–66 (2007). 
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under the Commerce Clause3 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,4 the requirements of due process5 and equal protection 
of the law,6 and the breadth of the First Amendment’s protections of 
religious7 and expressive freedom.8 Nor is the centrality of legislative 
facts to constitutional litigation anything new, though the frequency 
and extent of the Court’s reliance on them has increased with the 
late twentieth-century turn towards using balancing tests in 
constitutional law.9 To some extent the significance of legislative 
facts in constitutional cases is an inevitable corollary to judicial 
review, which makes all the more astounding the judiciary’s failure to 
establish a consistent or coherent approach to resolving disputes 
about them. Over the course of the last century, few issues have 
more persistently or profoundly perplexed judges than how they 
should address questions of legislative fact when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a challenged statute. 
This context is relevant to the debate over the Court’s use of 
foreign law in recent constitutional cases because in those cases the 
Court has employed foreign law not as law but rather merely as 
evidence of a legislative fact made relevant by the Court’s domestic 
constitutional jurisprudence. An extraordinarily impressive and 
diverse list of scholars has addressed the Court’s use of foreign law in 
constitutional cases.10 But to date no one has examined the matter in 
the context of the more general problem of how courts should 
determine legislative facts in constitutional cases. This Article 
undertakes that effort. 
The insights gleaned from considering the Court’s recent 
citation of foreign law within the broader context of the role played 
by legislative facts in contemporary constitutional adjudication are 
significant and wide-ranging. By focusing on the analytical work 
being done by the Court’s references to foreign law in the recent 
cases, it becomes clear that the Court has not truly engaged in 
 
 3. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 4. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).  
 5. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124. 
 6. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 7. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 8. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 9. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 974 (1987) (noting that the instrumental evaluation of competing interests is often 
expressed “in quasi-empirical terms”).  
 10. See infra Parts IV A.2, IV.B.2 
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comparative constitutionalism. Accordingly, many of the criticisms 
directed at the practice prove wide of the mark. So, too, many of the 
theoretically rich defenses of the practice are inapposite to what the 
Court has actually done in the controversial cases. Much of the 
existing debate is relevant only to a mode of constitutional 
interpretation far more ambitious and debatable than the Court’s 
actual method. 
Moreover, to the extent that the concerns addressed in the 
extensive public debate are shown to be pertinent to the way the 
Court has in fact employed foreign law, those concerns are equally 
implicated whenever the Court resolves a disputed question of 
legislative fact. In the end, the most profound issues genuinely raised 
by the Court’s recent interest in the laws of other nations can be 
traced to the confusion characterizing the Court’s approach to 
questions of legislative fact in constitutional cases more generally. 
The most promising consequence of the attention lavished on the 
Court’s relatively meager use of foreign law in a few salient 
constitutional cases may be a more widespread appreciation of the 
poverty of our understanding of the role questions of legislative fact 
do and should play in the practice of judicial review. 
In Part II, this Article examines the role that legislative facts play 
in constitutional adjudication, providing a context for understanding 
the Court’s reliance on foreign law in recent cases. Part III briefly 
discusses those cases in order to show that the Court employed 
foreign law merely as evidence of a legislative fact made relevant by 
established domestic constitutional jurisprudence. Next, Part IV 
demonstrates that the scholarly debate has so far not only largely 
ignored this reality but has also conjured a controversy unrelated to 
what the Court has actually done. In Part V, this Article places the 
Court’s use of foreign law within the context of the Court’s 
approach to all disputed questions of legislative fact, concluding with 
a discussion of the important but largely unexamined issues raised by 
the prevailing ad hoc approach to judicial determination of legislative 
facts in constitutional cases. Part VI concludes.  
II. THE FACTS OF THE MATTER 
The judicial process is oriented to the discovery of adjudicative 
facts, which is to say facts relating only to the parties involved in the 
litigation. By contrast, questions of legislative fact concern issues that 
reach beyond any particular discrete dispute to the empirical 
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foundation of a generally applicable rule.11 The speed at which a 
vehicle was travelling at the time of an accident is an adjudicative 
fact. Whether a lower speed limit would reduce the number and 
severity of accidents is a question of legislative fact, as is whether a 
specific abortion procedure is medically necessary in a significant 
number of cases. As these examples illustrate, questions of legislative 
fact often intertwine with predictive and normative assessments.12 
Courts are notoriously bad at resolving questions of legislative 
fact.13 The principal purpose of the judiciary, at least historically, has 
been to resolve discrete disputes between particular parties, and, 
accordingly, the institution is structured to that end.14 The 
adversarial system assumes that the contest between the parties will 
supply appropriate incentives for the discovery and disclosure of the 
most pertinent information and persuasive arguments, unless and 
until the cost of doing so exceeds either party’s estimation of the 
dispute’s value (or either party’s ability to pay). Much can and has 
been said on behalf of this structure as an engine for just resolution 
of particularized controversies.15 
But this structure is ill-suited to ensuring the appropriate 
investigation and consideration of issues of legislative fact. Neither 
courts nor the parties appearing before them have anything like the 
vast resources available to a legislature. In the rare cases in which the 
 
 11. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. 
CT. REV. 75, 77 n.9 (citing KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 
(1958)) (noting that the “phrase virtually belongs to Professor Kenneth C. Davis”). Other 
scholars have at times preferred the term “social facts” to Davis’s “legislative facts,” though the 
two terms appear to be coterminous in coverage. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Charles W. 
Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 69–70 (2008). This Article will 
use the term “legislative facts” throughout. 
 12. It is a fact’s relationship, or not, to such issues that make it legislative, or not, in 
character. For purposes of classifying facts as either legislative or adjudicative, it is immaterial 
whether claims about them appear in the statute itself or the formal legislative record, or 
nowhere in the law or its legislative history. Regardless, such issues matter in constitutional 
cases whenever doctrine makes them significant. See also infra notes 24–27 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Court’s varying treatment of factual findings in the legislative record).  
 13. This claim is developed at somewhat greater length in A. Christopher Bryant, The 
Empirical Judiciary, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 467 (2009) (reviewing DAVID L. FAIGMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008)). 
 14. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 979 (2009) (“[D]etermining the rights of the many 
on the basis of a lawsuit between the few can produce bad results.”). 
 15. But see T.H. WHITE, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING 220 (1940) (analogizing the 
adversarial system to trial by combat). 
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legislature’s prestige proves inadequate to draw forth voluntary 
production of information, resort may be had to virtually unlimited 
investigatory powers, including compulsory process.16 
Whereas the judicial process is designed to discover the details of 
discrete disputes, the deliberative nature of legislative bodies 
enhances their ability to determine legislative facts. Ordinarily a 
record is built first in parallel committees in both chambers, often 
over many years. That process is not merely open; it is self-
consciously orchestrated to stimulate public consideration of and 
ultimately involvement in a national debate, which in a feedback 
loop further informs and influences members of Congress. Perhaps 
most significantly, one aspect of the representation elected 
representatives provide their constituents is to reflect in miniature 
their constituents’ experiences, interests, and values.17 To be sure, 
the reflection is an imperfect and distorted one.18 But it would be 
hard to find a less representative body than the federal judiciary in 
general and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular. Exacerbating the 
rarified nature of the Justices’ backgrounds,19 their extraordinary 
isolation and resulting insulation from the lives of most ordinary 
citizens leaves them exceptionally poor barometers of present social 
realities. By contrast, the nature of elected office compels legislators 
to preserve channels of communication and opportunities for 
 
 16. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (reaffirming that 
the issuing of subpoenas is a legitimate congressional investigative power); Watkins v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate 
with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.”); 
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173–75 (1927) (holding that Congress has not only its 
enumerated powers but “such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate” to carry out 
its enumerated functions, including the power to compel the production of evidence). 
 17. See generally HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60–91 (1967) 
(discussing descriptive representational theory). 
 18. The U.S. Senate, for example, is often referred to as “the millionaires’ club.” See, 
e.g., William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 335, 369 n.189 (2000). 
 19. All nine sitting Justices received their law degrees from one of three northeastern, 
Ivy League law schools. The Justices are not even representative of the legal profession, which 
is itself hardly representative of the population at large. See John Schwartz, Weighing the Effect 
of an Ivy-Covered Path to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A18; cf. Lino A. 
Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as Our Official 
National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as the Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1139, 1141 (2004) (“Supreme Court Justices are almost always themselves products of elite 
academia and members of the cultural elite, seeking its approval and sharing its deep distrust of 
the mass of their fellow citizens . . . .”). 
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interaction with their constituents.20 The point of this comparison is 
not that no separation exists between the lives of elected 
representatives and those they represent, but rather, merely that 
institutional forces preserve a far more intimate connection than 
would be conceivable for Article III judges, especially those serving 
in the highly secluded setting of the nation’s highest Court. 
The energy of congressional mechanisms for the reception of 
legislative facts is underscored by the poverty of their judicial 
counterparts. The primary medium for injecting public information 
and opinion into litigation is the amicus brief—a tool of 
indeterminate impact employed in a scandalously undisciplined 
fashion.21 More generally, as recent decisions22 have made only too 
clear, and as two commentators recently remarked, the Supreme 
Court “has been inconsistent and result-oriented in its approach to 
social fact-finding.”23 Indeed, this claim understates the extent and 
depth of the doctrinal disorder. 
In fact, the Court’s approach to legislative facts in constitutional 
cases has been indefensibly ad hoc and, frankly, intellectually 
incoherent. Sometimes the formal legislative record reveals the 
legislature’s efforts to address a question of legislative fact. In many 
such cases, the Court has sententiously intoned upon its duty to 
 
 20. The notoriously contentious town-hall meetings on health-care reform in the 
summer of 2009 are merely the most vivid, recent illustrations that members of Congress 
expose themselves to public expression in ways unimaginable for a Supreme Court Justice. See 
Ian Urbina, Beyond Beltway, Health Debate Turns Hostile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at A1. 
That the Chief Justice was “very troubl[ed]” by President Obama’s relatively mild rebuke of 
the Court in his 2010 State of the Union address underscores the Justices’ lack of familiarity 
with face-to-face criticism of their work. See Robert Barnes & Anne E. Kornblut, It’s Obama vs. 
the Supreme Court, Round 2, over Campaign Finance Ruling, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2010, at 
A01. 
 21. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 97–98 (2008) (“[C]ourts routinely accept amicus briefs chock-full 
of factual assertions from interested parties who might, or might not, have expertise on the 
subject”); see also PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND 
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING (2008) (discussing the dramatic increase in amicus briefs filed in 
the U.S. Supreme Court and evaluating their impact); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 
(2000) (same).  
 22. Compare Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 936–37 (2000) 
(concluding that in the “medically related evidentiary circumstances” of the case a prohibition 
of the so-called partial-birth abortion procedure violated the Constitution), with Gonzales v. 
Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (finding sufficient “medical and scientific 
uncertainty” to sustain a similar ban without overruling Carhart I). 
 23. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 11, at 72. 
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defer to those efforts.24 When that has proven less convenient, the 
Court has stressed its obligation to resolve such questions 
independently.25 More commonly, the legislative record fails to 
reflect the legislature’s attempts, if any, to answer the question. In 
such cases, the Court has frequently acknowledged that legislatures 
are under no obligation to compile a record to serve the needs of the 
judiciary.26 Still, on other occasions the Court has identified the 
legislature’s failure to do just this as a reason to invalidate a statute.27 
Regardless of the state of the formal legislative record, once in 
court controlling issues of legislative fact are sometimes fully vetted 
at the trial level. In such cases, cognizant of the trial judge’s 
familiarity with the record and unique ability to hear live testimony 
(often from expert witnesses), the Court relies heavily upon the trial 
court’s findings of fact,28 unless and until it proves awkward to do 
so.29 In any event, the Court limits its review to the record compiled 
 
 24. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 
276–80 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1971); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 252–53 (1964).  
 25. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 162–65 (“The Court retains an independent 
constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”); 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932) (“In cases brought to enforce constitutional 
rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent 
determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that 
supreme function.”); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (discussing need 
for “independent [judicial] evaluation” of factual predicate for exercise of congressional 
power). 
 26. See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 156 (disclaiming any inference that Congress must make 
factual findings in order to legislate); see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 133 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing that the Court’s opinion ought not be read 
to suggest that evidence of the infeasibility of alternative regulatory regimes “must have been 
before Congress in order for the law to be valid,” because “[n]either due process nor the First 
Amendment requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even 
consideration, but only by a vote”). 
 27. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88–89 (2000) (citing 
congressional failure to document in the legislative record a widespread history of 
constitutional violations as a basis for the Court’s invalidation of challenged statute); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639–40 (1999) 
(same). See generally A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: 
The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001) (documenting and criticizing the Court’s reliance on perceived 
gaps in the formal legislative record as evidence in support of the Court’s contrary resolution of 
questions of legislative fact). 
 28. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 932–33, 936–37 (2000) 
(invoking district court findings of fact). 
 29. See, e.g., Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 162–63 (rejecting the factual findings of three 
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by the trial court,30 unless it looks to outside materials.31 When doing 
the latter, the Justices limit their investigation to materials cited in 
the parties’ briefs, except when they rely upon the briefs of amici,32 
or conduct their own independent investigations.33 In the latter case, 
the parties are almost never offered any opportunity to examine, let 
alone rebut, the sources ultimately relied upon, which may or may 
not be cited in the Court’s opinion.34 Not only has the Supreme 
Court from time to time employed all of these contradictory 
methods, but indeed so have most of the individual Justices.35 Most 
 
district courts that the banned abortion procedure was safer than alternatives in some 
significant subset of cases). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818–22 (2000); 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876 (1997); see also McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 11, at 
83 nn.66–67 (noting that in Reno v. ACLU and Playboy Entertainment Group the Court 
“based its own factual judgments on the findings in [the record on appeal] and did not rely on 
evidence drawn from amicus briefs”). 
 31. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003) (relying upon 
assertions of legislative fact made in briefs filed for the first time in the Supreme Court). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 83, 90–91 (2005) (describing Justice Blackmun’s 
summer visit to the Mayo Clinic library and dinner-table discussion with his daughters about 
abortion while drafting the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 34. See id. 
 35.  Compare, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–532 (1997) (Kennedy, 
J., for the Court) (assuming without empirical inquiry that state governmental discrimination 
against religious minorities was a substantially less serious problem than similar discrimination 
against racial minorities), with, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 
(1994) (Kennedy, J., for the Court) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court 
because “[o]n the state of the record developed thus far,” the Court could neither confirm nor 
reject Congress’s prediction that the economic viability of local broadcast television would be 
threatened absent the challenged statute’s must-carry requirements); compare also Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing 
that the Court’s opinion ought not be read to suggest that evidence of the infeasibility of 
alternative regulatory regimes “must have been before Congress in order for the law to be 
valid,” because “[n]either due process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be 
supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote”), 
with, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88–89 (2000) (Scalia, J., joining the 
opinion of the Court) (citing congressional failure to document in the legislative record a 
widespread history of constitutional violations as a basis for the Court’s invalidation of 
challenged statute), and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Exp. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 639–40 (1999) (same); compare also Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1, 64 (2005) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (faulting Congress for failing to provide evidence in support of its finding that 
permissive state policies would disrupt efforts to enforce federal drug laws), with Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 592 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (faulting the plurality for 
imposing a regime of “judicial second-guessing” on federal executive branch determinations 
that citizens must be detained indefinitely in support of the “war on terror”); compare also 
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bewildering has been the Justices’ frequent failure even to 
acknowledge the issue, let alone acknowledge that it remains 
unsettled. 
A few commentators have been somewhat more candid in 
acknowledging the problem.36 Still, the subject has not received the 
kind of extensive and sustained scholarly investigation its import 
clearly merits. Though the problem is a ubiquitous and recurring 
one, scholarly efforts to solve it tend to come in waves, with several 
scholars addressing the question during a particular window of time 
(often in response to one or two salient decisions) and then ignoring 
the matter for years.37 The issue implicates the very legitimacy of 
judicial review, so to disregard it is indefensible. At least some of the 
reasons for this neglect are apparent. Ironically, the very 
pervasiveness of the question accounts for a portion of the tendency 
to scholarly avoidance. The issue cuts across the areas of 
specialization that typically organize constitutional law scholarship. 
In any event, whatever the cause, judicial treatment of questions of 
legislative fact has proceeded ad hoc, if not haphazardly, a matter 
that constitutional theorists have largely neglected.38 
The point is not that blind deference is owed to Congress or that 
the Court ought never decide issues of legislative fact, but merely 
that its capacity to do so is grossly underdeveloped when compared 
to that of Congress and, moreover, when it has done so its methods 
have lacked doctrinal consistency and intellectual coherence. In the 
context of this unfortunate state of affairs, the Court has recently 
resorted to foreign law. 
 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 841 (2007) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting in an opinion in which Ginsburg, J., joined) (insisting on the need for judicial 
deference to a school board’s resolution of a disputed issue in the relevant social science 
literature), with Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 174 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting in an opinion in which Breyer, J., joined) (insisting that a division of professional 
medical opinion on the relevant issue precluded Congress from banning abortion procedure). 
The other four sitting Justices have yet to compile deep records on the matter, though it seems 
unduly optimistic to expect that they will fare much better.  
 36. See David L. Faigman, Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases, in HOW LAW KNOWS 
157 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007) (noting that “the Court has never developed an intelligible 
constitutional fact jurisprudence” and listing other sources); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 
11, at 72. 
 37.  See Bryant, supra note 13, at 469–72 (discussing history of scholarly treatment of 
the issue). 
 38. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 11, at 69 (describing “the peculiar and 
radically under-theorized nature of the treatment accorded congressional fact-finding” in 
constitutional cases). 
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III. FOREIGN LAW AS EVIDENCE 
The current, surprisingly high-octane controversy concerning the 
Court’s citation of foreign law in support of a constitutional ruling 
can be traced to an inauspicious, but in retrospect highly revealing, 
footnote in the Court’s 2002 opinion prohibiting the execution of 
the mentally retarded.39 Near the end of his majority opinion for the 
Court in Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Stevens cited an amicus brief 
filed on behalf of the European Union in support of the proposition 
“that within the world community, the imposition of the death 
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved.”40 This largely non-controversial 
claim41 was sandwiched between statements by representatives of 
diverse religious communities within the United States and public-
opinion polling data, all reflecting opposition to execution of the 
mentally retarded.42 The footnote itself explained that foreign 
practices merely served as “evidence of” a broad “social and 
professional consensus” against executing mentally retarded 
persons.43 
Whether such a consensus existed was a question of legislative 
fact made material to the Court’s analysis by the long established 
proposition that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”44 The Court embraced that view of the 
Amendment in its 1958 opinion in Trop v. Dulles, which barred 
denationalization as punishment. There the Court had also observed 
that “the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
 
 39. For an exhaustive analysis of the Court’s prior references to foreign law in 
constitutional cases, see Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court 
and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty 
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); see also A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler from an 
Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3 
(2009) (essay overview of last half-century of constitutional comparativism).  
 40. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
 41. Whereas the content of the assertion was not disputed, its relevance most surely was. 
See id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]f it is evidence of a national consensus for 
which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.”). 
 42. See Paolo G. Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global 
Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2003) (noting that the 
reference to foreign practice was “almost buried among the opinions of medical associations, 
religious organizations, and general polling data”).  
 43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (majority opinion). 
 44. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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nothing less than the dignity of man” and that “[w]hile the State has 
the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this 
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”45 
The Court’s reference to “civilized standards” implied that those 
standards would be derived at least in part from the contemporary 
practices of all “civilized” nations, not just the United States. 
Indeed, the Court invalidated the federal statute authorizing 
denationalization as a punishment on the ground that “[t]he 
civilized nations of the world [we]re in virtual unanimity that 
statelessness [wa]s not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”46 In 
so doing the Court demonstrated that the constitutionality of U.S. 
practices would be measured against other nations’ norms. Even the 
Trop dissenters acknowledged the relevance of other nations’ 
practices to the constitutional evaluation of a challenged 
punishment.47 One might reasonably challenge the legitimacy of the 
Trop standard as an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment,48 but 
it hardly constitutes an astounding twenty-first century innovation. 
Three years after Atkins, the Court in Roper v. Simmons held that 
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed when the 
offender was less than eighteen years old violated the Eighth 
Amendment.49 As in Atkins, the Court employed foreign law in 
support of its conclusion that a worldwide consensus existed against 
the execution of persons for their juvenile crimes. In Roper, however, 
foreign law played at once a far greater and more ambiguous role in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court than in the Court’s opinion 
in Atkins. Kennedy devoted an entire section of his opinion to a 
 
 45. Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. at 102. 
 47. Id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment did 
not prohibit denationalization in part because “[m]any civilized nations impose loss of 
citizenship for indulgence in designated prohibited activities”). 
 48. Scalia, for example, has announced that he “detest[s]” the phrase “evolving standard 
of decency” because, in his view, “societies don’t always mature. Sometimes they rot.” The 
Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 525 (2005) 
[hereinafter A Conversation]. For a defense of a “broad approach to constitutional 
interpretation in Eighth Amendment cases” on textual, historical, and instrumental grounds, 
see Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign Source Doctrine: Explaining the Role of Foreign and 
International Law in Interpreting the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1389, 1411–14 
(2007). 
 49. 543 U.S. 551 (2004). See generally Stephen Arvin, Comment, Roper v. Simmons 
and International Law, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 209 (2005). 
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discussion of foreign and international law, the first sentence of 
which stressed “the stark reality that the United States [was] the only 
country in the world that continue[d] to give official sanction to the 
juvenile death penalty.”50 This reality was not “controlling, for the 
task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the Justices’] 
responsibility.”51 But as in Atkins, which the Court cited as 
exemplary of this point, foreign law could be “instructive” to the 
Court’s independent determination that a punishment was “cruel 
and unusual.”52 
Exactly what instruction the Justices in the Roper majority took 
from foreign practice is unclear.53 But the best reading of Kennedy’s 
opinion is that foreign law provided evidence of a crucial legislative 
fact—namely, that as of 2005, revulsion was the consensus reaction 
of the world community to the juvenile death penalty. As in Trop 
and Atkins, that fact—that “reality”—gave particularized content to 
the “civilized standards” long mandated by the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. The “law” the Court enforced remained 
as American as apple pie; foreign law came into the analysis as 
evidence of a mere (legislative) fact to which the U.S. law was 
applied in turn. 
To be sure, Kennedy’s opinion is also amenable to a reading in 
which foreign law is invoked as support for the Court’s independent 
moral reasoning.54 On this view, the Court looks to foreign law as a 
model for the rule it chooses to impose on the United States, in much 
the same way that legislators in one state might look to sister states’ 
criminal codes when revising their own. When practiced by the 
Justices, this really would be comparative constitutionalism. But this 
reading attributes to Roper a construction of the Eighth Amendment 
 
 50. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; cf. Kuhner, supra note 48, at 1412 (“‘Cruel and unusual’ is 
a comparative phrase. It begs the question, ‘cruel and unusual compared to what?’”). 
 51. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
 52. Id. at 575–76. 
 53. See Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International 
Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (observing that “Roper is the latest of many decisions 
in which the Court has referenced comparative experiences to interpret constitutional 
guarantees without articulating a theoretical basis to justify the reference”).  
 54. For a classic exposition of the view that constitutional interpretation, rightly 
understood, obligates the Justices to engage in moral reasoning, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); see also RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 37 (1996) 
(“[F]idelity to the Constitution and to law demands that judges make contemporary 
judgments of political morality . . . .”).  
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that departs from, instead of carrying forward, the tradition launched 
in Trop, and echoed in Atkins, of looking to foreign law as evidence 
of civilization’s consensus.  
In any event, the extent of the Roper Court’s discussion of 
foreign law compounded by the ambiguity of its analytical function 
sparked unusually spirited criticism. In Judge Posner’s words, the 
“imprudence” of Roper’s most “egregious departure from 
conventionality” was demonstrated by “the surprising antipathy it [] 
provoked—surprising because the citations in judicial opinions rarely 
receive attention in the lay press.”55 Similarly, Frederick Schauer 
observed that the “focus of the debate on the citation to foreign (or, 
sometimes, international) law seems almost quaint.”56 To some 
extent, critics’ disproportionate focus on the role foreign law played 
in Roper may be in part because, in the period between Atkins and 
Roper, the Court had prominently relied upon foreign law in another 
controversial ruling. 
In Lawrence v. Texas,57 the Court overruled its sixteen-year-old 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick58 and held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded states from 
criminalizing sodomy among consenting adults.59 Again Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the Court and, along the way, took note of legal 
developments abroad. Specifically, he stressed that in 1957 an official 
report to the British Parliament recommended decriminalization of 
homosexual conduct, a recommendation Parliament enacted into law 
a decade later.60 “Of even more importance” than this legislative 
revision was the 1981 ruling of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,61 which found that Northern 
Ireland’s legal prohibition on consensual homosexual conduct was 
invalid under the European Convention of Human Rights.62 
 
 55. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 84–85 
(2005) (footnote omitted). 
 56. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1932 (2008) 
(footnote omitted). 
 57. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 58. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 60. Id. at 572–73. 
 61. Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 52 
(1981)). 
 62. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 52. 
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As in Roper, the analytical work accomplished by these references 
to foreign law was not altogether apparent from Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion. Considered in the immediate context of their discussion, 
these pieces of foreign law refuted the comprehensive claims made 
by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Bowers. There, 
Burger had asserted that legal condemnation of homosexual conduct 
was the norm “throughout the history of Western civilization,” was 
“firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards,” and 
was supported by “millennia of moral teaching.”63 These historical 
claims alleged legislative facts made relevant to the Court’s 
substantive due process analysis by numerous decisions over decades, 
which had established that for a right to be “fundamental” it had to 
be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”64 Burger 
insisted that, to the contrary, not just the American but indeed the 
entire Western tradition was to prohibit homosexual conduct as 
morally reprehensible. 
This context strongly suggests that Justice Kennedy cited the 
pre-Bowers laws of Europe because they gave the lie to the Chief 
Justice’s over-confident and overly simplistic historical claims. The 
Dudgeon case, in particular, was “at odds with the premise in Bowers 
that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western 
civilization.”65 So understood, the responsibility for first injecting 
foreign law into substantive due process belonged to Chief Justice 
Burger, and the discussion of foreign law in Lawrence served only to 
set the record straight.66 
In fairness, in Lawrence, as in Roper, the citation of foreign law 
could be understood as doing significantly more work. Near the end 
of his opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he right the 
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of 
 
 63. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196–97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 192 (majority opinion). 
 65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added). 
 66. Accord Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections 
on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 75–76 (2004) (concluding that the “Lawrence 
majority used actual examples to show that, in describing modern Western values, Burger . . . 
overstated the consensus.”). Justice Kennedy’s observation later in his opinion that “[o]ther 
nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of 
homosexual adults to engage in intimate sexual conduct,” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (citing 
Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–12, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 68), can be 
understood as serving this same corrective function. 
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human freedom in many other countries” and that there “has been 
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in 
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or 
urgent.”67 This language suggests a genuine constitutional 
comparativism; it can be read to suggest that the Court constructs, 
rather than interprets,68 the Constitution, and in so doing borrows 
liberally from the laws of other nations. As noted above, however, 
Justice Kennedy gave a more pedestrian explanation of foreign law’s 
relevance earlier in his opinion. Using foreign law to refute Burger’s 
overbroad historical summary fits seamlessly into the Court’s 
twentieth-century due process jurisprudence. A comparativism freed 
from such doctrinal constraints would, in contrast, represent a major 
restructuring of the Court’s role in our constitutional order. It is 
neither necessary nor prudent to read mere ambiguity to accomplish 
such a transformation, though scholars both celebratory and critical 
of such references to foreign law have been surprisingly quick to do 
so.69 
Indeed, with few exceptions,70 both friends and foes of foreign 
law in constitutional decision making start with the same, false 
premise: that foreign law operates as law in the analytical framework 
of the recent Supreme Court opinions invoking it. As noted above,71 
however, a more context-sensitive review of the citations undermines 
that assumption.  
So why have so many thoughtful readers nevertheless shared this 
false premise? There are many possible explanations, no doubt 
including the anticipatory motives of either preventing or 
encouraging a genuine constitutional comparativism by mooting the 
wisdom of the practice, with the recent cases merely providing the 
excuse to do so. But to some extent commentators have been misled 
by the law label. In the jurisdictions from whence they come, the 
cited authorities operate as law; hence they are assumed to act as 
legal authorities, albeit persuasive rather than binding ones,72 when 
 
 67. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 68. On the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional 
construction, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–7 (1999).  
 69. My focus has been on the role foreign law has played in the opinions for the Court; 
some opinions by individual Justices raise additional concerns, addressed at infra Part IV.B.1. 
 70. See infra notes 101–06, 137 and accompanying text. 
 71. See supra notes 39–69 and accompanying text. 
 72. Although, as Professor Schauer has demonstrated, “persuasive authority” is an 
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referenced in a Supreme Court opinion. How could a law itself 
become a fact?73 
In reality this phenomenon is not unheard of, though it is almost 
invariably a cause for confusion. Consider the somewhat anxious 
debate among the Justices in Gonzales v. Raich.74 There, a divided 
Court sustained the constitutionality of the federal Controlled 
Substances Act as applied to seriously ill California residents wishing 
to possess and consume small amounts of marijuana pursuant to 
California law.75 Justice Stevens, in his opinion for the Court, 
reasoned that Congress had power to prohibit even the petitioners’ 
marijuana possession because, were it unable to do so, Congress’s 
undisputed power to govern the vast, albeit illegal, interstate market 
in the narcotic would be compromised.76 The dissenters dismissed 
this threat, pointing to the extensive state-law regulatory regime in 
place to prevent in-state medical marijuana from leaking into the 
 
oxymoron, see Schauer, supra note 56, at 1940–52, I continue to use the term until his more 
descriptive “optional authority” gains wider currency. Other scholars have stressed that the 
nonbinding nature of the authority accorded foreign law mitigates the force of some critics’ 
concerns, especially those related to protection of U.S. sovereignty. See, e.g., T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 2010 (2004) (“[A]n account of popular sovereignty that is consistent 
with the dominant elements of the American political system . . . . [m]akes application of 
transnational law within the U.S. system less problematic than is usually supposed.”); Traci 
Donovan, Foreign Jurisprudence—To Cite or Not To Cite: Is That the Question or Is It Much 
Ado About Nothing?, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 761, 762 (2007) (arguing “that the Court’s 
references to international opinion and jurisprudence were simply parenthetical departures in 
the overall discussion and were not used by the Court to reach its conclusions” and that even 
“[i]f all references to foreign opinion and jurisprudence were removed from the opinions, the 
outcome would remain the same”); cf. Ronald A. Brand, Judicial Review and United States 
Supreme Court Citations to Foreign and International Law, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 423, 435–36 
(2007) (“None of the references to foreign law in opinions of the Supreme Court in cases of 
constitutional interpretation has ever suggested that the reference denotes precedential 
authority of any sort for the foreign law cited.”). 
 73. Of course all law is a “social fact” in the sense that its meaning and significance is 
socially constructed; but I am focusing on the analytical function of the referenced authority in 
the Justices’ train of reasoning. Some authorities operate as legal authorities. In the recent 
cases, however, the references to foreign law are best understood as providing support for a 
claim about a matter of legislative fact, which U.S. constitutional law (for better or worse) 
makes dispositive. 
 74. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). See generally A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of 
Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 146–51 (2007) (discussing the Raich 
decision and its significance within the context of twentieth-century Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence). 
 75. Raich, 545 U.S. at 9. 
 76. See id. at 22. 
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interstate recreational trade.77 Justice Stevens answered this argument 
with a rather pedantic reference to the Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause.78 
Of course, this reply missed the dissenters’ point entirely. They 
had not argued that California law was supreme over a federal 
statute. Rather, they had pointed to California state law as 
information bearing on a question of legislative fact—in this case, 
whether California’s medical marijuana regime would likely frustrate 
federal efforts to suppress the interstate trade in the drug for 
recreational use. The existence of a well designed state-law apparatus 
for preventing this from happening made it less likely and thus made 
the case for federal power weaker.79 California law was a “fact” in the 
dissenters’ legal argument; they never claimed that the California law 
operated to supplant an inconsistent federal statute.80 
In sum, one jurisdiction’s law occasionally itself becomes a fact to 
which a second jurisdiction’s law is then applied. Though potentially 
(and sometimes actually) confusing because of the awkward 
nomenclature, the practice is not only coherent but practically 
inevitable in a world with numerous and sometimes overlapping legal 
 
 77. Id. at 56 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 62–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 29 (majority opinion) (“The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that 
if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.”); see also id. at 
29 n.38 (accusing Justice Thomas of “turn[ing] the Supremacy Clause on its head”). 
 79. Id. at 55–56 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing California law and concluding 
that “[t]he Government has not overcome empirical doubt that the number of Californians 
engaged in personal cultivation, possession, and use of medical marijuana, or the amount of 
marijuana they produce, is enough to threaten the federal regime”); id. at 63 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (stressing the rigorous constraints imposed by California law and observing that 
“[t]hese controls belie the Government’s assertion that placing medical marijuana outside the 
[federal statute’s] reach would prevent effective enforcement of the interstate ban on drug 
trafficking”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brief for Petitioners at 33, Gonzalez v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 2004 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 480).   
 80. There are numerous other examples of one jurisdiction’s law serving as a fact 
relevant to an issue arising under a second jurisdiction’s law. Consider the role that state laws 
specifying the procedures for execution played in the Court’s evaluation of the constitutional 
challenge to lethal injection in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008) (“[W]e note at the outset 
that it is difficult to regard a practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it is in fact widely 
tolerated. Thirty-six States that sanction capital punishment have adopted lethal injection as 
the preferred method of execution.”), or the relevance accorded state laws in the Court’s 
opinion addressing a claimed due process right to DNA evidence in Dist. Attorney’s Office v. 
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009) (“‘[T]he States are currently engaged in serious, 
thoughtful examinations’ of how to ensure the fair and effective use of this testing within the 
existing criminal justice framework. Forty-six States have already enacted statutes dealing 
specifically with access to DNA evidence.”) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 719 (1997)), to choose but two additional examples from recent Supreme Court terms. 
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systems. In such a world it really should not be all that surprising or 
conceptually troubling that the legal regime of another sovereign 
might itself be an empirical reality relevant to the judicial task of 
applying general legal principles to particular cases. To the examples 
discussed above may be added the Court’s use of foreign law in 
constitutional cases. Considered in this context, the practice appears 
routine. Yet it has nevertheless proven singularly controversial.  
IV. MUCH ADO ABOUT VERY LITTLE 
Never in the field of scholarly conflict have so many argued so 
much about so little as in the contemporary debate about foreign law 
as a tool for constitutional interpretation. Taken altogether, no more 
than five pages in the U.S. reports, of indeterminate significance to 
the result in three rulings, account for the entire controversy,81 which 
has already produced thousands of law review articles from some of 
the most prominent scholars in legal academia.82 Even more striking 
than the volume of the relevant literature is that so much of it bears 
so little connection to what the Court has actually done. Detractors 
and defenders alike have attributed to the Court a far more muscular 
constitutional comparativism than the Court’s opinions actually 
warrant. 
A. Opponents 
The Court’s references to foreign law in Atkins, Lawrence, and 
Roper have provoked unusually severe and sustained criticism both 
on and off the Court. 
1. Jurists 
The self-appointed spokesperson for the Justices dissenting from 
this practice is Justice Scalia, who, to his credit, has engaged in an 
extrajudicial debate with Justice Breyer and discussion with the 
general public about why he finds the practice so objectionable. 
 
 81. See supra notes 40–68 and accompanying text. 
 82. See generally Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 647 (2008) (noting that “literally thousands of articles” have been 
published on the subject of the Supreme Court’s citation to foreign or international law in 
constitutional cases); Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of 
Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 647 (describing the breadth and intensity of the 
academic debate).  
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Scalia’s criticisms can be divided into two categories: originalist and 
other. 
Justice Scalia has argued that an originalist jurist can find no 
enlightenment in modern legal developments, foreign or domestic. 
To the extent that an originalist method of interpretation fixes the 
meaning of a constitutional provision for all time at the moment of 
its ratification, it is hard to quarrel with Scalia’s commonsense 
observation that subsequent practice can shed no light on what that 
meaning was,83 though some have tried.84 But as Scalia 
acknowledges, this objection is not to the use of foreign law in 
particular but rather to the concept of a living constitution more 
generally. For example, he resists on numerous grounds the half-
century-old Eighth Amendment doctrine committing the Court to 
the enforcement of “evolving standards of decency.”85 Indeed, he 
has remarked: “I detest that phrase.”86 Scalia’s arguments in 
opposition to a dynamic Eighth Amendment or Due Process 
jurisprudence have undeniable force. None of them, however, speak 
specifically to the use of foreign law as a source of information in 
interpreting a living constitution. To this extent, at least, his debate 
with Breyer is merely a warmed-over version of the decades-old 
controversy about originalism as a method of constitutional 
interpretation.87 
Scalia also makes an argument in the alternative: even if one were 
to embrace the concept of a living constitution and thus find post-
ratification moral sentiments to be relevant to constitutional 
interpretation, foreign law is a dubious source of relevant modern 
opinions.88 He reaches this conclusion for a number of reasons. First 
 
 83. See A Conversation, supra note 48, at 525. 
 84. See, e.g., David C. Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should be a Constitutional Comparativist 
. . . Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (2007). 
 85. See A Conversation, supra note 48, at 525. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 82, at 663 (“Largely, then, the rejection of the use of 
foreign materials rests on the argument that judges must confine themselves to considering the 
original intention of the Framers when deciding constitutional cases, something foreign law 
has little to say about.”). 
 88. See A Conversation, supra note 48, at 526. At their confirmation hearings, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito disclaimed both a thorough-going commitment to 
originalism as a method of, and reliance on foreign law as aid to, constitutional interpretation. 
See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on “Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. 
REV. 653, 661–62 (2006) (discussing Roberts’ and Alito’s expressions of “deep skepticism 
about the use of foreign authority in constitutional interpretation” during their respective 
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and foremost, he insists that the only post-ratification developments 
that could possibly be relevant to the meaning of the U.S. 
Constitution would be those occurring in U.S. society.89 In the 
Eighth Amendment context, Scalia’s position flies in the face of the 
fact that the “evolving standards” referenced in Trop were explicitly 
those of “civilized” societies.90 Not only would it be excessively 
“narrow or provincial”91 to conclude that the limits of civilization 
coincide with U.S. borders, but the analysis envisioned by Trop 
would have little meaning if it were insulated from reflection upon 
global trends.92 So too in Lawrence Justice Kennedy was attempting 
to answer Chief Justice Burger’s assertion in Bowers of universal legal 
condemnation of homosexual conduct “throughout the history of 
Western civilization.”93 Had Kennedy limited himself to 
consideration of domestic legal sources, his effort would have been 
patently nonresponsive. Once again, upon close examination, Scalia’s 
objection is really to the doctrine of making legislative facts and 
incorporating foreign experience relevant to constitutional 
interpretation, not to the use of foreign law as evidence in support of 
conclusions about these matters of fact. 
In at least one instance, though, Scalia objects to the latter 
instead of the former, and it is telling that this objection has perhaps 
gained the widest currency and proven most persuasive to the 
undecided.94 Scalia has attacked the Court’s recent invocation of 
foreign law as selective and results oriented,95 which, as others have 
 
confirmation hearings); Michael J. Gerhardt, The New Religion, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 399, 
402 (2007) (“One looks in vain in Roberts’ and Alito’s confirmation hearings for any 
description of them as ‘originalists’ or as approaching cases in a manner like Justice Scalia or 
Justice Thomas.”). Other sitting federal judges have also expressed reservations about the use 
of foreign law as a tool for constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Diarmuid O’Scannlain, What 
Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2005); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in 
Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423 (2004).  
 89. See A Conversation, supra note 48, at 526. 
 90. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 91. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 92. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 66, at 69 (describing as “[t]he most trenchant critique” 
of the Court’s use of foreign law in constitutional cases the accusation “that it serves as mere 
cover for the expansion of selected rights favored by domestic advocacy groups, for reasons 
having nothing to do with anything international”). 
 95. See A Conversation, supra note 48, at 521–22. 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:22 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1026 
demonstrated, it in some sense surely is.96 As noted above,97 
however, this undisciplined approach to determining and 
documenting legislative facts relevant to the disposition of 
constitutional cases is hardly limited to foreign law. Scalia’s concern 
about the Court’s selectivity in its choice of evidence is well taken. 
But when the problem of citation to foreign law is considered within 
the broader context of judicial resolution of questions of legislative 
fact, it becomes clear that none of the Justices is wholly free from the 
sin of this particular type of selectivity. Indeed, in this regard, Scalia’s 
fierce philippics against his colleagues’ capricious use of foreign law 
rain down equally upon his own head.98 
2. Scholars 
Numerous, prominent commentators have both echoed Scalia’s 
objections and added their own. As with some of Scalia’s concerns, 
some of the scholarly criticism depends upon a commitment to 
originalism,99 or can best be understood as hostile to the Court’s 
longstanding commitment to “civilized standards” in its modern 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.100 
 
 96. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 66, at 78; Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the 
Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 167 (2005) (“[B]ecause there are so many 
foreign jurisdictions to choose from and because the sources of international law (particularly 
the customary kind) are often so ambiguous that the whole enterprise is profoundly 
manipulable.”). 
 97. See supra Part II.  
 98. Compare, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing that the Court’s opinion ought not be read to suggest that 
evidence of the infeasibility of alternative regulatory regimes “must have been before Congress 
in order for the law to be valid,” because “[n]either due process nor the First Amendment 
requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, 
but only by a vote”), with, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639–40 (1999) (Scalia joining opinion of the Court citing congressional 
failure to document in the legislative record a widespread history of constitutional violations as 
a basis for the Court’s invalidation of challenged statute), and Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 88–89 (2000) (same). 
 99. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1097 (2004). See generally Zachary Larsen, Discounting Foreign Imports: Foreign 
Authority in Constitutional Interpretation & the Curb of Popular Sovereignty, 45 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 767, 769 (2009) (asserting that nearly all the scholarly objections to invocation of 
foreign law in constitutional adjudication “rest on either originalist or positivist assumptions 
about the Constitution that scholars who subscribe to non-originalist theories of the 
Constitution can easily ignore”). 
 100. See, e.g., Charles Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism, and Judicial Review, 11 
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But for present purposes the most telling critical commentaries 
stress the dubious link between foreign-law sources and the 
legislative facts for which they are cited as evidence. Michael Ramsey 
has exposed telling gaps in the presentation of foreign law to the 
Court in the Atkins and Lawrence cases.101 In the former, one brief 
informed the Court that China does not execute the mentally 
handicapped, but Ramsey’s review of the supporting citations made 
it “painfully obvious that no one connected to the matter even 
bothered to look up the relevant Chinese statute, much less make 
any inquiry into actual Chinese practice.”102 A second brief relied 
heavily on an incomplete and methodologically flawed voluntary-
questionnaire study.103 In Lawrence the briefs reported on a number 
of jurisdictions’ laws, without explaining why those jurisdictions had 
been chosen and seemingly similar ones neglected, inviting the 
supposition that the selection was result-oriented.104 
Professor Ernest Young has pointed out that use of foreign legal 
materials in constitutional interpretation may unduly strain the 
institutional competence of the legal profession. Both the “decision 
costs (the time, effort, and expense involved in deciding cases in a 
particular way)” and the “error costs (the likelihood of making 
mistakes by pursuing a particular method)” are unusually, and 
perhaps intolerably, high “given language and cultural barriers and 
most American lawyers’ lack of training in comparative analysis.”105 
 
WIDENER L. REV. 23 (2004). 
 101. Ramsey, supra note 66, at 73–79. 
 102. Id. at 78. 
 103. Brief of the European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner, McCarver 
v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL 648609. This brief was 
resubmitted in the Atkins litigation. See Joint Motion of all Amici in McCarver v. North 
Carolina, No. 00-8727, to Have Their McCarver Amicus Briefs Considered in This Case in 
Support of Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452), 2001 WL 
1682012. Professor Ramsey identified numerous methodological problems with the study that 
served as the basis for the E.U. brief. See Ramsey, supra note 66, at 78–79. 
 104. Ramsey, supra note 66, at 73. 
 105. Young, supra note 96, at 165–66. Professor Young acknowledges that similar 
concerns about the competence of advocates and judges might be raised about issues of 
“economics in antitrust cases, science and engineering in patent cases, [and] psychology in 
criminal cases.” Id. at 166. These parallels and their significance are discussed below. See infra 
Part V; see also Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, 
in THE FEDERAL VISION 213, 249–51 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) 
(suggesting that Justice Breyer ignored context which may have made the foreign models he 
cited less appropriate for the U.S. than he implied); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional 
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 126 (2005) 
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These concerns have both widespread and lofty appeal. Writing in 
the Harvard Law Review, Judge Richard Posner excoriated the 
Justices’ invocation of foreign law, branding it “promiscuous” on the 
grounds that it was selective, undisciplined, and result-oriented.106 
That these same adjectives might be used to describe the Court’s 
treatment of disputes about legislative facts more generally has, 
however, gone largely unnoticed.  
Other scholarly criticisms do not extend to the citation of foreign 
law as evidence of a legislative fact. Rather, they raise concerns 
implicated solely by a genuine constitutional comparativism—a 
judicial borrowing of foreign law in the construction of our own. 
Consider Professor Alford’s assertion that the Court’s citation to 
foreign law in recent constitutional cases creates an “international 
countermajoritarian difficulty.”107 This challenge raises important 
questions about a constitutional methodology in which judges “give 
expression to international majoritarian values to protect the 
individual from democratic governance.”108 With the possible 
exception of its half-century-old tradition of looking to the practices 
 
(conceding that “[d]etermining comparability” between foreign law and U.S. constitutional 
law “is a serious challenge, which cautions a slow and incremental approach to considering 
foreign law”).  
 106. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 85–86 
(2005) (“If foreign decisions are freely citable, any judge wanting a supporting citation has 
only to troll deeply enough in the world’s corpora juris to find it.”). Similarly, during his 
confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the use of foreign law as an aid to 
interpreting U.S. law in part on the ground that it was an indeterminate and manipulable 
source. See Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th CONG. 201 (2005) (statement of 
Judge Roberts) (“In foreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don’t find it in the 
decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia, or Japan, or Indonesia, or 
wherever.”); cf. Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide 
Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 24 (2005) (“[C]herry-picking of 
foreign authorities is always a potential problem when a court relies on foreign authority from 
one jurisdiction but does not consider other foreign jurisdictions.”). 
 107. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 57, 59 (2004). 
 108. See id.; see also Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and 
Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1309–10 
(2005) (stressing the U.S. Constitution’s grounding in the concept of popular sovereignty and 
concluding that the “formal acceptance of constitutional legal materials from outside [the U.S. 
legal] system is, to say the least, inconsistent with the traditional understanding of the compact 
between the governed and the government”); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and 
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2005–06 (2004) (noting that for “Europeans, 
one great marker of successful constitutional development is international consensus and 
uniformity,” but “Americans do not always understand this view”). 
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of all “civilized” nations to discern the contours of the Eighth 
Amendment,109 however, the Court has yet to do this. Instead its 
controversial citation of foreign law has been limited to the more 
pedestrian project of substantiating or questioning claims of 
legislative fact made relevant by domestic case law. 
To be sure, numerous commentators, and even individual 
Justices, have argued in favor of the kind of full-throated 
comparativism to which Professor Alford objects, and Alford’s 
comments contribute significantly to this on-going, but as yet 
academic, debate. But that discussion, as fascinating as it may be, 
ought not obscure the fact that what the Court has already done—
namely, used foreign law as evidence of legislative fact—has been 
exposed as selective, incomplete, and results-oriented. These 
criticisms are all the more significant because they can be made of 
the Court’s approach to questions of legislative fact more generally. 
3. Politicians 
The singularly hostile reaction on the part of many in Congress 
to the Court’s recent foray into foreign law adds no new arguments 
to the conversation, but it nevertheless merits brief discussion.  
Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper were flashpoint cases. Hence, it was 
not surprising that they provoked harsh criticism, including attacks 
by some in Congress.110 What was surprising, however, was how 
much of the criticism focused on the Court’s invocation of foreign 
law in these decisions. As Judge Posner has observed, “the citations 
in judicial opinions rarely receive attention in the lay press.”111 For 
similar reasons, they would ordinarily be ignored on Capitol Hill. 
But in the immediate wake of Roper, a resolution was introduced in 
the House of Representatives declaring that “it is the sense of the 
House of Representatives that judicial interpretations regarding the 
meaning of the Constitution . . . should not be based in whole or in 
part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign 
 
 109. Arguably Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), did commit the Court to the 
“expression to international majoritarian values to protect the individual from democratic 
governance,” Alford, supra note 107, at 59, in the Eighth Amendment context. See supra 
notes 44–48 and accompanying text. To that extent, however, Professor Alford’s quarrel is 
with that Warren Court ruling, not with the citation of foreign law by the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts. 
    110.  See Alford, supra note 88, at 661–63.  
 111. Posner, supra note 106, at 85 (footnote omitted). 
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institutions.”112 Representative Steve King, an Iowa Republican, 
investigated the Justices’ foreign trips, with an eye towards exposing 
the corrupting influence of such sojourns.113 Others went so far as to 
call for the impeachment of Justice Kennedy as a remedy for his 
citation of foreign law in Lawrence and Roper.114  
The passionate political opposition aroused by the Court’s recent 
rulings, no doubt, has many causes, including fears and resentment 
about globalization’s perceived tendency toward centralization and 
the empowerment of elites. But at least some of the intensity of the 
antipathy grows out of the dissatisfaction that comes with the 
realization that the emperor has no clothes. How else might one 
explain Representative Tom Delay’s peculiar pique upon learning 
that not only did Justice Kennedy cite foreign sources, but also that 
“he said in session that he does his own research on the internet,” an 
offense Delay deemed “just incredibly outrageous.”115 Why would 
the mental image of Justice Kennedy googling the juvenile death 
penalty be especially likely to prompt Delay to grind his teeth? While 
he did not elaborate, it seems likely that the image captures the 
capriciousness of the Court’s use of foreign law. A Justice crafting his 
own internet queries is freed from even the modest discipline the 
appellate process ordinarily imposes; the parties (and their amici) do 
not have the chance to filter and interrogate the raw data reflected in 
foreign statutes and rulings–a chance that they might have, to some 
extent, were the foreign materials cited in the briefs. 
Given the undisciplined manner in which the Justices have made 
use of foreign law, this reaction to Kennedy’s disclosure should come 
as no great surprise. What is surprising is that, to date, the outrage 
has been cabined and has not extended to the equally undisciplined 
way in which the Court treats most questions of legislative fact that 
arise in constitutional cases. 
 
 112. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).  
 113. See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law 
Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 44 (quoting 
Representative King as saying that his study of the Justices’ trips revealed “that there are at 
least a couple of Justices, chiefly Kennedy and Breyer, who are more enamored of the 
‘enlightenment’ of the world than they are bound by our own Constitution”). 
 114. See Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A1. 
 115. Carl Hulse, Delay Outlines Strategy Against Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2005, at A20. 
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B. Proponents 
1. Jurists 
Justice Breyer has been Justice Scalia’s counterpart in the debate 
about the propriety of foreign law sources in constitutional cases. In 
both his extrajudicial defense of the practice and his work as a sitting 
Justice Breyer occasionally embraces what amounts to a genuine 
constitutional comparativism. In other words, he is, at times, willing 
to borrow the reasoning and conclusions of lawmakers in other 
jurisdictions when deciding what the U.S. Constitution both should 
and does mean. In collapsing these two inquiries, Breyer invites 
many of the criticisms discussed above.116 But so far he has, in this 
regard, spoken only for himself.117 And even then, he has often 
hastened to couch his position in ambiguous language that at once 
downplays its theoretical import and reflects diffidence about its 
legitimacy. 
His enthusiasm for foreign law was reflected in his much 
publicized 2005 exchange with Justice Scalia at American University. 
Justice Breyer’s description of the role that foreign law can and 
should play suggested a genuine comparativism, in which the Justices 
create U.S law in the image of what they determine to be well-
conceived foreign models. He characterized the practice as “opening 
your eyes to what is going on elsewhere, taking what you learn for 
what it is worth, and using it as a point of comparison where doing 
so will prove helpful.”118 Foreign statutes and judicial rulings 
comprise “food for [the] thought” of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. 
At other places in his remarks, however, Justice Breyer suggested 
that foreign law might merely serve as evidence of a legislative fact.119  
 
 116. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
 117. Reliance on foreign law in constitutional cases finds some support in the 
extrajudicial commentary of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and 
Ginsburg as well. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (“We 
are the losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others.”); David M. 
O’Brien, More Smoke than Fire: The Rehnquist Court’s Use of Comparative Judicial Opinions 
and Law in the Construction of Constitutional Rights, 22 J.L. & POL. 83, 85 (2006) (asserting 
that “[t]he late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
were moderately open to the use of comparative law” in constitutional decision-making 
(footnotes omitted) (citing speeches by Rehnquist and O’Connor)). To date, however, Justice 
Breyer has taken the lead in advancing and defending the practice publicly.  
 118. A Conversation, supra note 48, at 524. 
 119. Id. at 529. 
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In practice, Justice Breyer’s invocation of foreign law has been 
more guarded. A telling example is provided by his separate dissent 
in Printz v. United States.120 There, a five-justice majority invalidated 
a provision of the federal gun legislation popularly known as the 
Brady Bill on the ground that it impermissibly impressed state and 
local executive officials into the enforcement of federal law.121 Justice 
Breyer joined the principal dissent, written by Justice Stevens, but 
also wrote a short opinion of his own noting that “[t]he federal 
systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for 
example, all provide that constituent states, not federal 
bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, 
regulations, or decrees enacted by the central ‘federal’ body.”122 He 
reasoned that this “comparative experience” demonstrated that there 
was “no need to interpret the Constitution as containing an absolute 
principle—forbidding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to 
any state official.”123 His willingness to mold American constitutional 
law in the shape of three European nations provides a clear example 
of his enthusiasm for a genuine constitutional comparativism. 
Nevertheless, even here, Justice Breyer qualifies his endorsement 
of such an approach by couching it in language suggesting the use of 
foreign law as evidence of legislative fact. The experience of foreign 
nations  
here offers empirical confirmation of the implied answer to a 
question Justice Stevens asks: Why, or how, would what the 
majority sees as a constitutional alternative—the creation of a new 
federal gun-law bureaucracy, or the expansion of an existing federal 
bureaucracy—better promote either state sovereignty or individual 
liberty?”124  
Even so, his separate dissent was joined by only one of his three 
fellow dissenters. His opinion in Printz simultaneously provides 
evidence of his willingness to embrace constitutional comparativism, 
his ambivalence about the theory underlying the practice, and the 
Court’s reluctance as yet to go so far. 
 
 120. 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 933 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 977. 
 124. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
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2. Scholars 
Some of the criticisms directed at the Court’s reliance on foreign 
law appear, on close examination, to be anticipatory, if not alarmist. 
But nowhere is the disconnect between what the Court has actually 
done and the extrajudicial commentary more stark then in the 
writings of the practice’s academic defenders. 
Dean Harold Koh has long stood at the forefront of a general 
campaign for legal globalization. He has called for the creation of a 
transnational jurisprudence “whereby domestic systems incorporate 
international rules into domestic law through a three-part process of 
interaction, interpretation, and norm internalization[,] . . . with 
judicial interpretation of domestic constitutions representing” one 
important channel for this evolutionary process.125 As even he 
occasionally concedes, however, his views run ahead of the Court as 
an institution, though perhaps not some of its individual members. 
While he roots his vision in the writings of “Chief Justice (and 
former congressional secretary for foreign affairs) John Jay and Chief 
Justice (and former secretary of state) Marshall,”126 he also 
acknowledges that his project is a work in progress insofar as the 
current Court is concerned.127 Indeed, he characterizes judicial 
invocation of foreign law in death penalty cases as “looking to 
foreign practice for additional evidence of modern standards of 
decency in a civilized society,”128 a description suggesting foreign law 
constitutes a source of empirical data concerning legislative facts 
made relevant by domestic law.129 
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter has articulated a compelling 
vision of a global community of courts in which “participating 
judges see each other not only as servants and representatives of a 
particular polity, but also as fellow professionals in an endeavor that 
transcends national borders.”130 But she has also acknowledged that 
 
 125. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 
55–56 (2004). 
 126. Id. at 52. 
 127. Id. at 52–56 (contrasting a transnationalist jurisprudence, exemplified by one wing 
of the Court, with a nationalist jurisprudence promoted by other Justices skeptical of a 
transnationalist approach). 
 128. Id. at 55 n.89 (emphasis added). 
 129. See supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text for a similar characterization of the 
Supreme Court’s use of foreign law in the Eighth Amendment context. 
 130. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 
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“the global community of courts does not yet include all courts from 
all countries, or even all international courts and tribunals” but 
rather “is a partial, emerging community”131 in which “U.S. judges 
are beginning to take part.”132 So too, Jeremy Waldron’s celebration 
of a modern ius gentium133 and Gerald Neuman’s defense of a 
“suprapositive” or normative role for foreign law in domestic 
constitutional deliberation134 outrun the actual judicial practice 
described above. To be sure, the visions articulated by these and 
other scholars advocating a greater role for foreign law in U.S. 
constitutional litigation may accord with the aspirations of Justice 
Breyer. But they far exceed the present juridical reality, in which 
foreign practice is cited as evidence of emerging consensus (or, as in 
Lawrence, the lack thereof) on questions of legislative fact. 
My point is not to denigrate these important contributions to a 
rich and on-going academic debate. Rather, my modest goal is only 
to note that the debate in which they play a part has, to date, 
remained an academic one. What is lamentable, however, is that the 
brilliance of this conversation has obscured the more pedestrian, but 
no less meaningful, questions the Court’s actual practices raise. 
Those questions are not limited to the few cases in which the Court 
cites foreign authority but instead include the wide array of cases in 
 
193 (2003). But see Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the 
Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 114 (2007) (arguing that “the Court’s tendency 
[in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence] to avoid deep questions, count noses, and seek 
incompletely theorized agreements” suggests “that the Court is unlikely to become the kind of 
thoughtful, sophisticated comparativist that engages with other legal systems envisioned by 
some scholars”).  
 131. See Slaughter, supra note 130, at 194. 
 132. Id. at 199. 
 133. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005). The Latin phrase refers to the Ancient Roman recognition of a law 
common to all peoples. See generally Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the Law of 
Nations in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act and International Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 193, 199–213 (2005) (recounting the origins and evolution of the term).  
 134. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 87 (2004). Neuman acknowledges that the Court’s 
invocation of foreign law in cases such as Lawrence “represents a rather modest use of 
international law in aid of constitutional interpretation.” Id. at 89; see also Roger P. Alford, In 
Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 704 (2005) 
(essaying, and critiquing, “an emerging inchoate comparative constitutional theory” drawn 
from “various writings advocating the use of international and foreign material in 
constitutional adjudication”). 
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which the result turns, even implicitly, on judgments about 
debatable issues of legislative fact. 
V. THE CONTEXT OF LEGISLATIVE FACTS 
Most of the discussion provoked by the Supreme Court’s recent 
reliance on foreign law has been premature. To a great extent, that 
debate has addressed doctrinal innovations that the best reading of 
the Court’s opinions do not support, let alone require. To date, the 
Supreme Court has not engaged in a genuine constitutional 
comparativism in which it freely and forthrightly molds our 
fundamental law to make it more like that of favored foreign nations. 
To be sure, numerous commentators,135 and even a few sitting 
Justices,136 have advocated just this kind of constitutional borrowing. 
But the Court has yet to take this step. 
Consideration of the Court’s citation of foreign law within the 
broader context of its effort to discern and detail legislative facts 
reveals that the most trenchant criticisms of what the Court has 
already done have nothing to do with the extraterritorial origin of 
the cited sources.137 The ways in which the Court has to date used 
foreign law in constitutional analysis pose no greater threat to U.S. 
sovereignty138 than the Court’s selective reliance on factual claims 
made in amicus briefs. To be sure, a “democratic deficit” may result 
from reliance on foreign sentiment, but to no greater extent than 
when the Justices substitute their own impressions of social reality 
for those of the legislature they are reviewing.139 Foreign laws 
 
     135.   See supra Part IV.B.2.  
     136.   See supra Part IV.B.1.   
 137. Cf. Parrish, supra note 82, at 655 (acknowledging that the “worry of cherry picking 
is a legitimate concern” but asking rhetorically how is reliance upon foreign law “different in 
kind from citation to a whole host of other sources that the Supreme Court uses regularly, 
tendentiously or not, without comment”). Professor Parrish suggests that the lack of 
“comment” vindicates reliance on foreign law. But the parity he identifies is better understood 
to mean that the Court’s undisciplined use of foreign law is merely a tiny tip of a huge iceberg. 
 138. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also ERIC D. HARGAN, THE 
SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICATIONS OF TWO RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070324_hargensov.pdf. 
 139. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (invalidating the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in part because the Court deemed discrimination against 
religious minorities an insufficiently widespread and serious problem to justify a prophylactic 
remedy); see also A. Christopher Bryant, The Pursuit of Perfection: Congressional Power to 
Enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 579, 588–89 (2010) (developing 
this reading of Flores in greater detail). 
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provide evidence of facts to which the U.S. Constitution applies, but 
they do not supplant it. 
These observations in turn teach that much of the scholarly 
debate, and especially the more heated rhetoric from Congress, has 
been beside the point. It is of course entirely appropriate to debate 
the wisdom of an approach that is, at present, hypothetical. But now 
it should be clear that that is what scholars have been doing, to a 
great extent. And in any event, the possibility that the Court may 
take this step in the future provides scant basis for threatening sitting 
Justices with impeachment.140  
Increasing awareness that the Court’s use of foreign law in 
constitutional cases has to date been confined to proving legislative 
facts does much more than merely mute some of the more strident 
elements of the discourse. It promises to guide the debate in a more 
promising direction. As jurists and commentators have forcefully 
argued, the Court’s use of foreign law, even when properly 
understood as evidence of legislative fact, remains problematic. The 
Court’s selection of foreign nations for study, determination and 
characterization of the laws of those nations, comprehension of their 
legal and social contexts, and inferences from these materials to the 
complex and contested claims of legislative fact leave much to be 
desired in terms of intellectual rigor and consistency.141 Even 
defenders of the Court’s use of foreign law in constitutional cases 
concede as much.142 The most compelling critiques call for 
 
 140. See DeParle, supra note 114, at A1 (noting calls for the impeachment of Justice 
Kennedy in part for his invocation of foreign law in constitutional cases). 
 141. See supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
 142. See A Conversation, supra note 48, at 530 (Justice Breyer acknowledging as a “fair 
criticism” the claim that the Justices’ use of foreign law has at times been selective and result-
oriented); see also Dianne Marie Amann, International Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1319, 1338 (2006) (conceding that consultation of foreign sources cannot play an 
appropriate role until “it occurs within a predictable and consistent interpretive framework” 
which has yet to emerge); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 96 (2006) (admitting that “aspects of the Court’s approach to international law 
raise cautionary flags” and that “[t]he use of international law can be sloppy, misguided, and 
even opportunistic”); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 459, 497 (2010) (noting that the “connections between American law and that of 
other communities remain contested” and that accordingly “the rule of law requires that 
material taken across boundaries bear a defensible relationship to existing cultural practices and 
political commitments”); cf. Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional 
Comparison, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 947, 987 (2008) (urging adoption of a proposed 
methodology to guide comparative inquiry in part because it would “answer the concern, 
raised by critics of comparison, about the potential for selectivity or ‘cherry-picking’ on the 
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improvement in these areas, though some commentators doubt 
whether the flame can ever be made worth the candle.143 
Thus, one result of the Supreme Court’s controversial citation to 
foreign law in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper has been to direct 
attention to the rigor, or more accurately the lack thereof, with 
which the Court uses such sources as evidence of legislative fact. 
What even the commentators who have noted as much have not 
done, however, is consider the controversy over citation to foreign 
law within the context of the Supreme Court’s efforts to ascertain 
and document relevant legislative facts in constitutional cases more 
generally.  
Perhaps the most valuable outcome of this sprawling debate will 
be an increased awareness of the central role that disputes about 
legislative facts have come to play in modern constitutional law. Such 
disputes are ubiquitous, occasionally obviously determinative,144 but 
more frequently of somewhat indeterminate significance,145 if not 
altogether inchoate.146 Many of the criticisms leveled at the Court’s 
use of foreign law apply with equal force to the Court’s approach to 
questions of legislative fact more broadly. The impetus to bring 
greater caution and discipline to the Court’s use of foreign law as 
evidence should be extended to the Court’s use of social science, 
reliance on empirical claims in amicus briefs, and trust in the Justices’ 
unexamined hunches based on their idiosyncratic experience. 
Furthermore, critics have questioned the Court’s institutional 
capacity to learn the cultural and legal context necessary to achieve 
sophisticated appreciation of foreign law’s empirical significance.147 A 
 
part of the Justices”); Parrish, supra note 82, at 653 (noting that “scholars who have 
championed comparative constitutionalism . . . recognize that foreign sources must be used 
with care” and that “Justices should use foreign sources in a refined manner and be wary of 
cultural context”) (footnotes omitted). 
 143. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 66, at 82. 
 144. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 145. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (concluding that 
Congress’s extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to the states “was an 
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem,” raising questions as to that 
unresolved legislative fact’s constitutional relevance) (emphasis added). 
 146. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–532 (1997) (assuming 
without empirical inquiry that state governmental discrimination against religious minorities 
was a substantially less serious problem than similar discrimination against racial minorities). 
 147. See supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
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similar skepticism is in order insofar as the Court relies on other 
sources of evidence about disputed or uncertain legislative facts.148 
Finally, some have reasonably concluded that the incremental 
value of foreign law to constitutional adjudication is outweighed by 
the burdens on both jurists and litigants that are associated with its 
careful excavation and use. In much the same way scholars might 
profitably reflect on the balance of efforts and rewards involved in 
the employment of other sources of information to determine and 
document claims about legislative facts. The late-twentieth-century 
turn towards balancing “tests” in constitutional law made jurists’ 
conclusions about legislative facts, whether express or implicit, 
central to the operation of constitutional law.149 Arguably a little-
perceived cost of this move has been to tax the judiciary with tasks 
beyond any claims it makes to competence, let alone expertise. 
Ultimately, the challenges posed by Justice Scalia and Professor 
Ramsey, if taken to their logical conclusion, threaten to unravel 
much of modern constitutional law. Whether one condemns or 
reveres them for this consequence depends much on the extent of 
the beholder’s attachment to the constitutional status quo.  
Not only has the bulk of the discussion applied only to what the 
Supreme Court might do in the future, but the genuine problems 
presented by what the Court has done have long stymied 
commentators addressing them in parallel contexts. As noted above, 
over the course of the last century, few issues have more persistently 
befuddled judges and their fellow travelers than how courts should 
address questions of legislative fact when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a challenged statute.150 In light of this history, it 
should surprise no one that the Court’s approach to foreign law in 
constitutional cases has been ad hoc, undisciplined, and arguably 
result-driven. The same has been said of the Court’s use of scientific 
 
 148. See generally FAIGMAN, supra note 21; see, e.g., id. at xiii (“The Constitution was 
founded upon enlightenment principles, yet the Court’s approach to the empirical world 
remains mired in the Dark Ages.”). Whereas some of those critics who have acknowledged that 
foreign law has served as evidence of a relevant legislative fact in the recent controversial cases 
have reasonably questioned the rigor with which this evidence is uncovered and employed, 
what has heretofore gone unremarked is that the Court’s treatment of legislative facts more 
generally is subject to the same criticisms. 
 149. See Aleinikoff, supra note 9, at 974. 
 150. See supra Part II. 
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data,151 in particular, and approach to questions of legislative fact, 
such as the scope of perceived social problems, more generally.152  
Only recently have constitutional law scholars again turned their 
attention to the Court’s underdeveloped approach to questions of 
legislative fact presented in constitutional cases. Evaluation of the 
Court’s invocation of foreign law in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper 
should be made a part of the broader effort to bring coherence to 
the Court’s treatment of legislative facts, whatever sources the 
Justices cite. A comprehensive discussion of this larger issue is 
beyond the scope of an Article identifying its relevance to the 
foreign-law debate. Nevertheless, some of the questions raised are 
identified below in order to illustrate how the larger effort might 
proceed and how it would advance the analysis of the recent cases. 
The one certainty concerning the Court’s approach to legislative 
facts in constitutional cases is that the Court ought to do better than 
it does. As noted above,153 the chief deficiency with the current 
methodology is that there isn’t one. A first step towards establishing 
a self-conscious methodology would be to articulate principles 
allocating responsibility for decisions of legislative fact issues among 
trial and appellate courts. These principles must not only take 
account of the relative institutional strengths of each level of judicial 
hierarchy but must also incorporate such considerations as the need 
for uniformity of result and the competency of other branches of 
government to engage in constitutional construction. 
The most that can be hoped for from an understanding that 
foreign law has acted as evidence of fact in recent constitutional cases 
is that this insight will serve to spur analysis of the ubiquitous 
problem of the Court’s haphazard and under-theorized approach to 
legislative facts. Justice Scalia and Professor Ramsey, among others, 
have struck a nerve with their observations that the Court’s 
treatment of foreign law has lacked a theoretical foundation and 
empirical rigor and, accordingly, has appeared selective and result-
oriented. Even the most ardent defenders of current practice 
concede that the invocation of foreign law could and should be done 
 
 151. See generally FAIGMAN, supra note 21 (critiquing the judiciary’s approach to 
scientific issues in constitutional cases). 
 152. Id. (discussing and criticizing the Court’s approach to facts in constitutional cases); 
see also McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 11, at 74–83 (identifying fundamental 
inconsistencies in the Court’s approach to congressional fact-finding in constitutional cases). 
 153. See supra Part II. 
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with greater attention to the domestic context in which that law is 
found as well as to the practices of all similarly situated nations.154 
One can hope that the foreign law debate’s attention to the rigor 
with which such sources are used will in turn inform the Court’s use 
of other types of evidence invoked as proof of relevant legislative 
facts.  
V. CONCLUSION 
One commentator recently characterized the judicial and 
scholarly debate over foreign law in constitutional interpretation as a 
“storm in a teacup,” and to the extent that the controversy has 
outgrown the reality of judicial practice to date, the label is a fair 
one. Allowing the insight afforded by another common metaphor, 
however, where there is so much smoke there must be fire. In this 
instance, the genuine difficulty underlying the Court’s use of foreign 
law in recent constitutional cases is that the Justices’ approach to this 
evidence has lacked the rigor requisite to inspire confidence in their 
conclusions. 
But that concern is by no means limited to the Court’s use of 
foreign law. To the contrary, it extends to the Court’s treatment of 
all manner of evidence of legislative facts. The concern is endemic to 
the modern practice of judicial review and deserves far greater 
sustained, critical inquiry than it has been accorded.  
 
 154. See sources cited supra note 137. 
